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3Conceptualization and Methodology
The two preceding chapters, which reviewed the literature on electoral change both in
general and in Turkey, revealed that (1) in general, social cleavages and values ac-
counted for long-term volatility, and retrospective voting for short-term volatility, and
that (2) in Turkey, the dominant framework is broadly socioeconomic, and few studies
have explicitly used the social-cleavage, values, or retrospective-voting approach.
There is a need to fill this theoretical and empirical void in these areas of research in
Turkey. Accordingly, this study adopted the social-cleavage and retrospective-voting
approaches.
This chapter explains the framework of the study, the dependent and independent
variables, the main hypotheses, the analytical method, and the data sources. In brief,
the study uses statistical analysis to investigate, at the provincial and national levels,
how social cleavages and economic change affect electoral volatility in Turkey. The
object of the study is not individual voters but rather groups of voters that share a
socioeconomic environment.
3.1. Framework of the Study
The primary aim of this study is to understand the nature of the dependent variable
(electoral volatility) and its relationship with social cleavages and economic change.
Relevant hypotheses are tested over time and space using time-series (1950–2002)
and cross-sectional (1961–2002) analyses. The unit of analysis varies from the whole
nation to the province.1 The difference in time span between the time-series and cross-
sectional analyses is due to the paucity of cross-sectional data for the pre-1961 period.
The basic advantage of treating a collectivity of individuals as the unit of analysis
lies in the fact that behavioral outcomes include social interactions in a shared cultural
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and geographical environment. As pointed out by Agnew (1989), place is where
individuals with various socioeconomic variables interact before making their own
decisions. In the case of the Kurds in Turkey, for instance, it is the feudalistic social
structure of southeastern Turkey, rather than Kurdish ethnicity per se, that led to high
electoral volatility among voters in the pre-1980 period.2 This study thus analyzes the
combined effect of sociopolitical variables attributed to individuals and interactions
between such variables.
3.2. Dependent Variable: Electoral Volatility
The dependent variable of this study, electoral volatility (total electoral volatility), is
defined as the sum of absolute differences in the party vote percentage between two
consecutive elections, divided by two.3 Although total electoral volatility indicates the
level of party system instability in general, it does not specify what constitutes the
instability. In fact, various combinations of vote swings represent different dimen-
sions of electoral volatility in the aggregate.4 Bartolini and Mair (1990, chap. 1)
divided total electoral volatility into inter-bloc volatility and within-bloc volatility.5
For them, the term “bloc” referred to either the parties of the left or the right. How-
ever, as they pointed out, the concept of “bloc” does not have to be confined to the left-
right dimension. This study expands the concept to analyze four inter-bloc volatilities
(Table 3-1). The first two, which reflect cleavage structures (cleavage-type volatili-
ties), are left-right volatility and systemic volatility. The other two, which reflect
voters’ retrospective evaluation of government performance (retrospective-type vola-
tilities), are incumbent volatility and traumatic volatility.
Left-right volatility consists of absolute net vote swings between the votes for the
left- and the right-wing parties. It is calculated as the absolute sum of differences in
the vote percentage for the parties in the left (or right) bloc between two consecutive
elections. In Turkey, left-wing parties are more secular and more supportive of the
state’s role in the economy than are their right-wing counterparts (Mango 1991, pp.
171–79).6 Right-wing parties are more religious and more supportive of the free
market.7 (For the classification of political parties in Turkey, see Appendix I and
Appendix II). It is not only in Turkey that religiosity is a major defining element of the
TABLE 3-1
INTER-BLOC VOLATILITIES DEFINED
Type of Inter-bloc Vote SwingVolatility Volatility
Cleavage Left-right Secularism and the public sector vs. religion and a market economy
Systemic Pro-systemic vs. anti-systemic
Retrospective Incumbent Government vs. opposition
Traumatic Former/present incumbents vs. others
Source: Compiled by the author.
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left-right dimension. Empirical findings have shown that religiosity was a stronger
determinant than social class of issue positions (economic and noneconomic) on the
left-right scale (Inglehart 1984, pp. 53–57; Lijphart 1979).
Systemic volatility is comprised of absolute net vote swings between the pro-
systemic parties and potentially anti-systemic parties. Potentially anti-systemic par-
ties in Turkey include pro-Islamic, nationalistic, and pro-Kurdish parties. Since all
these parties proclaim abidance of the law, their anti-systemic nature is only potential.
Incumbent volatility is expressed as absolute net vote swings between the govern-
ing party/parties and the opposition parties. Governing parties are defined here as
those that participated, for more than one year, in the final government before a
general election.
Traumatic volatility is represented by absolute net vote swings between the parties
that have at any time remained in government for more than one year consecutively,
and those that have not.
As shown by the above definitions, cleavage-type volatilities and retrospective-
type volatilities are qualitatively different in terms of the criteria of voters for their
party choice. Cleavage-type volatilities seem to be associated with attempts by voters
to find parties that better represent their social grouping, while retrospective-type
volatilities are influenced by voter evaluations of the past performance of the
incumbent(s) (and former incumbents). The two types of inter-bloc volatilities there-
fore require separate analytical settings and different independent variables.
Figure 3-1 shows that cleavage-type volatilities (CVs) were nearly as strong as
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Source: Compiled by the author from Appendix III and Appendix IV.
Notes: 1. Four types of inter-bloc volatilities overlap each other in one way or
another.
2. CV = cleavage-type volatility, RV = retrospectivetype volatility.
Fig. 3-1. Inter-bloc Volatilities, 1965–2002
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retrospective-type volatilities (RVs) during the pre-1980 period. During the post-1980
period, however, cleavage-type volatilities became far less significant than retrospec-
tive-type volatilities. Total electoral volatility was more reflective of retrospective-
type than cleavage-type volatilities during the post-1980 period than during the pre-
1980 period. Although cleavage-type volatilities (left-right and systemic volatilities)
seem to have grown in the 1990s in absolute terms, this increase came from the
expanding overlap between cleavage-type and retrospective-type volatilities. When
the overlap was controlled for, cleavage-type volatilities turned out to be smaller
during the post-1980 period than during the pre-1980 period (Figure 3-2).8
One should be careful therefore not to treat total electoral volatility as the depen-
dent variable. Since cleavage-type and retrospective-type volatilities are subject to
different kinds of mechanisms, and as their rise and decline are not significantly
associated if the overlaps are controlled for, it would be more meaningful to sepa-
rately analyze two groups of dependent variables—cleavage-type volatilities (Chap-
ter 6 and Chapter 7) and retrospective-type volatilities (Chapter 8 and Chapter 9).
Source: Compiled by the author from Appendix III and Appendix IV.
Note: The cleavage-volatility index (CVI) measured composite cleavage-
type volatility, with composite retrospective-type volatility controlled for.
The CVI was calculated as the difference between (1) the mean between
left-right and systemic volatilities and (2) the overlap between the mean be-
tween left-right and systemic volatilities, and the mean between incumbent
and traumatic volatilities divided by two. The overlap was calculated as the
difference between (1) the sum of the mean between left-right and systemic
volatilities, and the mean between incumbent and traumatic volatilities and
(2) total electoral volatility.
The retrospective-volatility index (RVI) measured composite retrospec-
tive-type volatility, with composite cleavage-type volatility controlled for.
The RVI was calculated as the difference between (1) the mean between
incumbent and traumatic volatilities and (2) the overlap, as defined above,
between the mean between left-right and systemic volatilities and the mean
between incumbent and traumatic volatilities divided by two.
Fig. 3-2. Cleavage- and Retrospective-Indices of Volatility
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3.3. Independent Variables: Cleavages and the Economy
For the independent variables in this study, two of the four models of electoral change
reviewed in the previous two chapters, i.e., the social cleavage model and the retro-
spective voting model, were chosen. Party identification was discarded as an indepen-
dent variable not only because of a lack of relevant data at the provincial level. It was
also done because party identification has been a controversial independent variable
when applied to countries other than the United States.
The value approach was not simply put aside, but was partially integrated into the
social-cleavage approach. Values can be conceptually divided into materialism and
postmaterialism, but in the actual operationalization of the concept, the difference is
blurred. In particular, most existing research includes religiosity within postmaterialist
values. While religiosity is definitely not materialist, it is also prematerialist. As
shown by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), the secular-religious cleavage preceded the
materialistic capital-labor one.9 This ambiguity of operational definitions is under-
standable given that the values approach grew from an attempt to revise the conven-
tional social cleavage approach. However, such approaches are concerned with how
voters’ material and nonmaterial interests are represented by political parties. It seems
reasonable here to operationally expand the scope of social cleavages to include both
conventional social cleavages and postmaterial values.
Table 3-2 shows the list of variables used in this study. The first independent
variable (the strength of social cleavages in the province) is measured by the demog-
raphy of the politically significant societal groups. These societal groups are the pious
Sunnis, the Kurds, and the Alevis. A full explanation of the choice and measurement
of these variables is given in Section 6.1 of Chapter 6.
Second, the independent variable for the retrospective voting model is the change
in economic conditions prior to a general election. Nearly all previous studies on
retrospective voting treated economic conditions as short-term variables (measured
for at most one year) and demonstrated that voters were sensitive to short-term
changes in their well-being when deciding to vote for or against the incumbent(s).
Although retrospective voting does not deal with electoral volatility per se, vote losses
TABLE 3-2
LIST OF VARIABLES FOR ANALYSIS
Independent Variable Dependent Variable Time Span Expected Effect
Social cleavages Cleavage-type volatility Long Negative
Change in
economic conditions Incumbent vote change Short Positive
Source: Compiled by the author.
Note: Incumbent vote losses are indicated by minus signs. In contrast, electoral volatility takes a
value not less than zero.
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for the incumbent(s) account for a substantial part of electoral volatility, especially
when the incumbent(s) has (have) served a full term.
3.4. Main Hypotheses
The preceding two sections defined, both conceptually and operationally, the depen-
dent and independent variables. This study uses these variables to test the relation-
ships (1) between social cleavages and cleavage-type volatilities using the cross-
sectional analysis at the provincial level during the 1961–2002 period and (2) between
change in economic conditions and incumbent vote change using both the time-series
analysis during the 1950–2002 period and the cross-sectional analysis at the provin-
cial level during the 1977–1999 period. Two major hypotheses can be formulated:
Assumption 1: Strong social cleavages stabilize the relationship between cleavage
groups and political parties.
Hypothesis 1: Those provinces with stronger social cleavages have smaller cleav-
age-type volatilities (left-right and systemic volatilities) than do those with weaker
social cleavages.
Assumption 2: Voters punish the incumbent in accordance with the most recent
economic performance prior to the election.
Hypothesis 2: The worse the economic conditions prior to the election, the larger
the vote losses for the governing party/parties.
Before testing the above hypotheses (in Chapter 6 through Chapter 9), it is neces-
sary to show that Turkey can serve as a case for analyzing democracy in developing
countries. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 thus make an exploratory investigation of the
nature of electoral democracy and participation in Turkey.
3.5 Methodology and Data
This study uses separate regression analyses to test the effects of (1) social cleavages
and (2) economic conditions on electoral volatility over time and space. For the
social-cleavage model, the unit of analysis is the province. For the retrospective-
voting model, it includes both the nation and the province. Detailed explanations of
methodology and data are given at the beginning of the relevant chapters (Sections 6.1
and 6.2 in Chapter 6 and Sections 9.1 through 9.4 in Chapter 9). For the calculations,
statistical package programs such as SAS, SPSS, EViews, and STATA were used.
Although this study is not intended to make inferences regarding individual behav-
ior from aggregate data (ecological inference), the statistical method used here is
identical with that used for ecological inference. Problems with ecological inference
have been discussed extensively, especially since Robinson (1950) warned of the
ecological fallacy. Leo Goodman later proposed the application of a regression model
to the problem of aggregation bias pointed out by Robinson.10 The Goodman model
(ecological regression), however, contained a shortcoming in that it assumed constant
variance in the error term of the regression, which is not necessarily true in reality
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(King 1977, chaps. 3–4). This is a typical problem of heteroscedasticity, which is
most commonly found in cross-sectional data. Heteroscedasticity occurs when the
variance of the dependent variable for each value of the independent variable is not
constant.11
In this study, to cope with the potential problem of heteroscedasticity, power
transformations were used,12 when necessary, to reduce the skewness of the distribu-
tion of the dependent and independent variables.13 Then, each regression result was
checked using the White test (Johnston and Dinardo 1997, pp. 166–67) for any sign of
heteroscedasticity.
Parenthetically, the logit transformation was not used for the value of electoral
volatility. Although electoral volatility (and its subtypes) can in theory range from 0 to
100 (expressed in percentage), its mean was about 21 for Turkey and its distribution
thus did not approximate the logit distribution. In fact, regressions using logit values
of electoral volatility showed a worse fit than did regressions using the original
values.
This study relied on electoral, socioeconomic, and demographic data at the national
and provincial levels. The main source of data is the State Institute of Statistics
(SIS).14 Other secondary sources include academic articles and books. See the Appen-
dixes for the complete list of data sources.
3.6. A Note on Voter Registration Data
It may be appropriate to discuss the reliability of voter registration in Turkey.15
Permanent voter lists were introduced in 1950, but the voter registration office was
not established until the enactment of the Law for Basic Rules of Elections and Voter
Registration (Law No. 298, April 26, 1961). Law No. 2234 (May 17, 1979), which
amended some articles of Law No. 298, stipulated the renewal of voter registration
every four years, although this rule has not been strictly observed. “House confine-
ment,” introduced under the same amendment, has been implemented for every voter
registration since 1979.16 While these measures seem to contribute to limiting irregu-
larities in voter registration, the delay in computerizing the registration process17
makes it difficult to coordinate registration across constituencies, leaving room for
some types of irregularities.
In particular, as a result of internal migration on a massive scale, there may be a
large number of migrants whose previous voter registrations in their native villages
have not been erased. Thus, voters in net-emigrant provinces may be double-regis-
tered. If this is the case, then the rate of voter turnout in the net-emigrant constituen-
cies will be reported as lower than it actually is. (Voting rates in the net-immigrant
constituencies can be considered more accurate, since internal immigrants cannot
vote until they are registered there.) This section examines whether the present level
of irregularities in voter registration invalidates the previous findings.
According to an official of the Supreme Election Board,18 there are two potential
sources of irregularities in voter registration. One is double registrations, and the other
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voter transfers. On the first issue, the fact that neither residential nor voter registration
has been fully computerized in Turkey allows or results in double registrations. It is
not unusual for Turkish citizens, particularly those from rural areas, to intentionally
have two or three registered addresses. These citizens have double or triple voter
registrations, which are prepared in accordance with their residential registrations.
Unintentionally as well, old registrations can remain on the book even after the death
or emigration of a voter. The number of un-erased registrations thus increases with
each election.
On the second issue, voter transfers between constituencies occur when marginal
votes can influence the electoral outcome in a constituency. This can happen in
municipal elections, parliamentary by-elections, or general elections for highly com-
petitive constituencies. Voter transfers, however, are not very widespread over the
country. Thumbprints are taken to prevent voters from voting more than once.
The above information provides some clues for an examination of voter statistics
irregularities. First, both sources of irregularities should in theory bloat the number of
registered voters. For double registrations, this is obvious by definition. Voter trans-
fers or transports (across constituencies by bus) also artificially increase the number
of registered voters since these transferred voters have to be registered beforehand in
the constituency. Second, the extent of over-registrations should be greater in the less
developed provinces than in the more developed ones, because the less developed
provinces have a larger net out-migration (to other provinces) than the more devel-
oped ones do. Out-migrants can be an important source of unintended irregularities in
voter registration, as discussed above.
With these two assumptions, it is possible to measure the extent of irregularities in
voter registration by comparing the number of registered voters and the estimated
population of voting age calculated from the most recent population census, taken in
1997, prior to the general election in 1999. The most recent years were chosen for
analysis since, according to the official cited above, unintended double registrations
are accumulating over time, without checks. In the remaining part of this section, two
null hypotheses will be tested for the data shown in Table 3-3. If there are rampant
irregularities in voter registration, then the following two hypotheses must hold. First,
the number of registered voters should be unnaturally close to or even greater than the
estimated population of voting age. Second, the rate of registered voters to the esti-
mated population of voting age should be higher in the less developed provinces than
in the more developed ones.
The data in the table provides, however, no significant signs that the number of
registered voters was extensively bloated. First, the voter registration percentage at
the national level was estimated as somewhere between 93.3 and 103, according to
the following procedure. At the national level, the ratio of registered voters to popula-
tion of voting age was 93.3 percent (Table 3-3). The denominator (population of
voting age), however, included “privates and corporals serving in the armed services,
students in military schools, and detainees and convicts in prisons” (Flanz [2003],
p. 77), who are barred from voting under Article 67 of the Constitution.19 The results
of the General Population Census do not include the number of such people who have
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no right to vote even when they are of voting age. In order to obtain the entire military
population, the civilian population (64,062,820)20 was subtracted from the total popu-
lation (67,844,903)21 as of 2000. The military population as of 2000 was thus esti-
mated to be 5.57 percent of the total population. When this same percentage was
applied to the total population as of 1999, the military population was estimated to be
27,258,755, or 9.8 percent of the population of voting age for 1999. (This percentage,
9.8, includes not only privates and corporals but also other higher ranking solders and
officers.) The addition of this percentage, 9.8, to the ratio of registered voters (93.9)
yields 103.7. This figure suggests that the voters are far from double-registered, given
that it includes an unknown percentage of military officers who are eligible to vote
and thus should have been discounted from it.22 This result rejected the first hypothesis.
Second and more importantly, the rate of registered voters to the estimated popula-
tion of voting age was lower in the less developed provinces than in the more devel-
oped ones. This result rejected the second hypothesis. In fact, the above-cited official
attested that in less developed provinces, the rate of registered voters to the population
at voting age was low. He explained that young people in less developed provinces
tended to first enter military service and then settle in large cities, like Istanbul, where
they made their first voter registration. Since their permanent addresses remained in
their native provinces, the rate of voter registration in those provinces tended to be
lower than in the more developed provinces.23 The rate of young people subject to
military conscription to the total provincial population is also higher in the less
developed provinces. Taken together, these results imply that the lower electoral
turnout in the less developed constituencies does not come from irregularities in
voting registration.
Note
1 The province is the largest administrative unit of local administration in Turkey. The
number of provinces increased from 67 to 81 between 1989 and 2000. When this study
dealt with provincial socioeconomic data, the number of provinces analyzed was kept at 67.
2 See Section 6.3 of Chapter 6.
3 See note 2 of Introduction.
4 Total electoral volatility is synonymous with electoral volatility, which is used in more
general contexts. Therefore, the term “total electoral volatility” will be used when various
dimensions of electoral volatility are discussed.
5 Inter-bloc volatility is calculated as the absolute sum of differences in the vote percentage
for the parties in either bloc between two consecutive elections. Inter-bloc volatility thus
measures volatility between one bloc of parties and the other. Within-bloc volatility is the
residual of inter-bloc volatility in total volatility. Within-bloc volatility, by definition, con-
sists of volatility within one bloc and volatility within the other.
6 Mango suggested that the secular-religious divide, while parallel to the one in Europe,
might be deeper in Turkey (p. 173). See also Rubin and Heper (2002).
7 Far-right parties, however, are less supportive of a free market economy than are center-
right parties.
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8 The cleavage-volatility index and the retrospective-volatility index were not statistically
correlated (r = 0.137, p = 0.746). Although the small sample size (N = 8) is one reason for
the statistical insignificance, the correlation coefficient is still too low to argue that the two
volatilities should be analyzed in combination.
9 Inglehart (1999) also recognized that religiosity had survived the value change.
10 Aggregation bias is considered to occur when individual data are aggregated into collective
data in certain forms of grouping (but not in others). These forms of grouping include (1)
grouping by the dependent variable (for instance, if students of different ethnicities are
grouped by class achievement before their ethnicity is correlated with class achievement)
and (2) grouping by a variable related to both the independent and dependent variables
(Langbein and Lichtman 1978, pp. 17–21).
11 This is typically seen in the relationship between income and vacation expenditure of the
household in a sample population. When the income is small, the variance of travel expen-
diture is small due to the upper limit. When the income becomes larger, the variance of
expenditure increases since the household can choose either to restrain or to expand the
expenditure (Johnston and DiNardo 1997, p. 163). In general, when actual positive num-
bers are used for a regression, the variance of the dependent variable for each value of the
independent variable typically increases as the mean of the independent variable increases.
This is because as the mean of the dependent variable grows larger, the maximum possible
range of values for the dependent variable to take also expands.
12 Logarithmic transformation appeared to be the most appropriate method for the data used
in this study.
13 “Regression does not require assumptions about the distribution of X variables, but in
practice skewed X distributions are often associated with statistical problems such as
influence and heteroscedasticity” (Hamilton 1992, p. 55).
14 Data on per capita provincial incomes were kindly provided to the author by the State
Institute of Statistics in electronic files.
15 Information on voter registration was obtained from the study by Erol Tuncer (2003, pp.
215–19).
16 House confinement for voter registration was introduced as a temporary measure in 1973.
17 In the 2002 general election, registration was computerized for 32 out of the total of 81
provinces (Tuncer 2003, p. 220).
18 Interview with S¸adi Tokay, Vice General Director of Electoral List (Seçim Kütü%gü Genel
Müdür Yardımcısı), Supreme Election Board (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu), August 9, 2002,
Ankara.
19 A constitutional amendment that was passed on October 3 and promulgated on October 17,
2001 lifted the ban on people detained or convicted for professional negligence.
20 Data accessible from the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey’s website (http://www.
tcmb.gov.tr/).
21 Data accessible from the State Institute of Statistics’ website (http://www.die.gov.tr/).
22 The most recent evidence also indicates that the number of registered voters is smaller than
the number of people eligible to vote (if registered). In the 2002 general election, the
Supreme Election Board expected 45 million voters to be registered according to the latest
2000 population census and population growth since that time. In reality, however, only
41.4 million voters were registered. See Cumhuriyet (Istanbul), October 30, 2002.
23 See note 18.
